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Anselm Sprandel studied economics in Heidelberg and 
Hamburg. In 1992, he joined the public service in Hamburg 
where he held various positions, among others as the head 
of the department responsible for child day-care centres at 
the Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, Family and Integration. 
In October 2015, he was appointed head of the Central 
Coordination Unit for Refugees (ZKF) for the Free and 
Hanseatic City of Hamburg. The unit is responsible for housing 
and fi rst integration measures for the tens of thousands of 
refugees that have come to Hamburg since 2015. 
In 2015, like many European cities, Hamburg 
faced a peak in refugee arrivals. Since 
January 2015, 71,000 refugees have arrived 
in Hamburg and 39,000 are still living in 
the city. Most refugees came from war-torn 
Syria, and from the troubled states of 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran and Eritrea. Since 
last year, Hamburg has also seen a rise in 
Turks fl eeing their country and applying for 
political asylum in Germany.
At the peak of the crisis at the end of 2015, 
authorities in Hamburg focused on one 
objective: preventing homelessness without 
seriously impacting the life of Hamburg’s 
1.85 million citizens. As the pressure on 
housing rose, the municipality developed 
proactive methods based on legislation to 
house refugees in decent conditions and 
the Hamburg Senate created the Central 
Coordination Unit for Refugees (ZKF) to 
reduce bureaucracy and enable quick 
decisions and implementation. The city 
has shown great resilience in coping with 
the massive infl ux of refugees since 2015. 
Three main factors of success can be 
highlighted: (1) the particular socio-cultural 
background in Germany and Hamburg, 
(2) the governance mechanisms set up 
to deal with this unprecedented situation 
and (3) the involvement of civil society and 
participation of citizens. 
By Anselm Sprandel, 
Head of the Central Coordination Unit for Refugees (ZKF), 
Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg
INTRODUCTION 
January 2015 started with about 1,500 refugees 
arriving in the city of Hamburg. Four months 
later, the number climbed to about 2,000. Then 
came the “wave” and numbers rocketed: In 
October, about 10,400 people found their way 
to the port city. Refugees were exhausted and 
in poor health after weeks of marching along 
stretches of the Balkan route which started 
in Greece. Many were traumatised by war 
experiences in countries like Iraq and Syria. 
Some of them had seen friends and family 
members drown near them as crammed boats 
capsized while heading from the Turkish coast 
to Greek islands in the Aegean Sea, or from 
Libya to Italy.
High-quality public housing project in Mittlerer Landweg, 2017      
Both pictures ©ZKF
ARTICLE FOLLOWED BY AN INTERVIEW WITH GUILLAUME CAPELLE, 
CO-FOUNDER AND DIRECTOR OF SINGA
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Challenges and risks 
specifi c to urban areas 
In the Balkan region, authorities were overwhelmed by the 
situation; refugees at borders were simply waved to the north 
while governments all over the European Union were under rising 
pressure to stop illegal immigration. In early 2016, borders along 
the Balkan route were shut down. 
In March 2016, the European Union and Turkey signed a deal 
under the terms of which Ankara agreed to stop asylum seekers 
from crossing by sea to Greek islands in return for €3 billion in 
aid to deal with millions of Syrian refugees living on Turkish soil. 
Subsequently, the number of refugees reaching Hamburg fell 
dramatically. The situation is now more or less normal, with 
713 refugees arriving in Germany in May 2018. A total of 413 
were allowed to stay while the rest were distributed to other 
states in Germany. In line with the so-called “Königsberg quota”, 
Hamburg receives 2.52% of all people applying for asylum in 
Germany. This distribution quota takes many factors of each of 
the 16 German states into consideration, such as demographics 
and economic strength.
1. FACTS AND FIGURES
Some 71,000 refugees came to Hamburg from January 2015 until 
May 2018 – in a city of about 1.85 million people. After registration, 
about 39,000 of them were assigned to stay in the city state; the 
others were sent to other states in Germany. 
At the end of April 2018, 3,390 refugees were living in Hamburg’s 
12 initial shelters (Erstaufnahme-Einrichtungen) and 25,113 in 
125 public housing sites (Folge-Unterkünfte). This is a total of 
28,503 refugees living in publicly funded and operated facilities. 
In addition, some 10,000 refugees found a haven in Hamburg’s 
normal housing market between January 2015 and April 2018. 
2. THE THREE STEPS TO HOUSING REFUGEES
Refugees are first assigned to initial shelters, where they await a 
decision about their asylum application and where they benefi t from 
the fi rst integration measures such as language classes. All children 
and teenagers are sent to kindergartens or schools. In these shelters, 
social workers (65 refugees per social worker) and translators support 
the newcomers. Initial shelters have a canteen for all and shared 
bathrooms; many are made of Lego-like container units.
Usually, after a maximum of six months, refugees are moved from 
initial shelters to public housing units where families have their own 
flat, or six men share a three bedroom flat. Each apartment offers 
privacy with its own bathroom and kitchen. In public housing, the quota 
is 80 refugees per social worker. 
Refugees at some point move from public housing units into the 
normal housing market, where they rent their own flat and need no 
more “intensive care” from social workers. Most adult refugees have 
by then learnt German, are visiting a university, are in some job training 
programme or are even already working and paying income taxes. 
3. TACKLING THE HOUSING CRISIS
At the peak of the crisis at the end of 2015, 
authorities in Hamburg focused on one objective: 
preventing homelessness without seriously 
impacting the life of Hamburg’s 1.85 million citizens. 
In the shortest time possible, dozens of new refugee 
housing sites for thousands of people were built, 
and kindergartens and school capacities expanded. 
Housing facilities mushroomed all over the city as 
authorities rented or bought thousands of special 
containers, rented buildings or transformed halls 
of defunct fi rms into living facilities for refugees. 
The Bundeswehr (army) and the Technisches 
Hi l f werk  ( Technic al  Rel ief  Aid),  a  national 
organisation, opened barracks, set up provisional 
tent sites and transformed empty halls into huge 
dormitories. The pressure was immense for weeks 
as no one knew when the refugee wave would ebb 
and stay down. 
This crisis also hit Hamburg at a very unfavourable 
moment: the city was and is still suffering from 
a shortage of affordable housing because of an 
economic boom coupled with a high demand for 
urban flats. This situation became even more 
intense when tens of thousands of refugees 
poured into the city. The other German city states, 
Berlin and Bremen, faced similar hardships. 
Rural states like Bavaria or Saxony had far fewer 
problems fi nding and setting up housing facilities, 
and their housing markets offered much more 
affordable rental apartments than city states.
4. TACTICS AND GUIDELINES TO 
MASTER THE LOGISTICS OF HOUSING 
TENS OF THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE
A) Hamburg applied the legal possibil ity of 
section 246 of the National Building Code (§ 246 
Baugesetzbuch), a special regulation that allows 
temporary refugee accommodation units to be 
built in industrial and other non-residential areas 
in times of crisis. Hamburg could therefore start 
immediately on the construction of the dwellings, 
even though the development plan for a specific 
area envisaged a different use.
“A HIGHLIGHT SINCE 2015 HAS BEEN THE 
CRUCIAL ROLE PLAYED BY CIVIL SOCIETY 
GROUPS AND VOLUNTEERS […] MORE THAN 
110 GROUPS AND INSTITUTIONS CAME 
TOGETHER IN THE “COALITION OF REFUGEE 
AID INITIATIVES IN HAMBURG.”
21
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B) Unlike the city state of Berlin, the city of 
Hamburg did not use sport halls of schools for 
refugee accommodation in order to avoid impacting 
school children. It bought or rented empty halls of 
Praktika and Max Bahr, two DIY (Do it Yourself) 
firms that had gone bankrupt before the refugee 
crisis. The City of Hamburg also bought and rented 
thousands of containers for housing refugees in 
Lego-like modular architecture.
C) Emphasis was put on the city’s in-house 
expertise to avoid, whenever possible, involving 
the private sector. Two companies owned by 
the Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg carried 
out numerous crucial tasks, from overseeing 
construction to operating sites:
•  Sprinkenhof AG is the city’s asset and project 
manager for the rental, leasing, construction and 
renovation of municipal real estate – including 
housing sites for refugees. It guarantees the 
professional planning, control and execution of 
projects in the sole interests of the city. 
•  fördern & wohnen (f & w) is Hamburg’s second 
asset, responsible for operating almost all 
refugee housing sites. In order to relieve f & w, the 
city asked relief aid organisations to operate a 
small number of refugee housing sites – such as 
the German Red Cross, Malteser and Johanniter. 
The Hamburg authorities deliberately opted not 
to hire private fi rms to run such sites. Berlin did 
that and paid a high price, for example by having 
a number of ready-to-occupy shelters empty for 
months because fi rms were suing. 
D) In the summer of 2016 a new central “Arrival 
Centre” opened its doors in the Rahlstedt 
neighbourhood, where every refugee entering 
Hamburg has to register. In this facility with 
the capacity of processing 400 people per day, 
refugees fi rst undergo a medical check.  They then 
register and write as well as submit their asylum 
application to the Federal Offi ce for Migration and 
Refugees (BAMF), which has a team at the Arrival 
Centre. After staying there for a few days at a 
housing section, refugees move to initial shelters 
or are distributed to other German states, in line 
with the above mentioned distribution quota.
E) The Hamburg senate, or government, set 
off a housing boom by approving in 2017 the 
construction of 13,411 apartments. The year 
before, the number was 12,471. It was 9,560 in 2015. Authorities 
expect the city’s housing shortage to start easing by end 2019.
F) In cooperation with the HafenCity University in Hamburg, in 
2016 the authorities organised “Finding Places”, a three-month 
participation project for citizens from the city’s seven districts. 
In workshops, they used an interactive technology, a so-called “city 
scope” co-developed with the MIT in the USA, to suggest areas for 
housing refugees. As a result, three areas for 624 refugees were 
realised and fi ve areas for 688 refugees were kept in reserve. 
5. “WILLKOMMENSKULTUR” (WELCOMING 
CULTURE) AND THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY
A highlight since 2015 has been the crucial role played by civil society 
groups and thousands of volunteers from all walks of life. They were 
right from the beginning on the ground, helping with managing and 
distributing food and clothing donations. They comforted refugees 
with traumatic experiences during warfare in their home countries 
and while fl eeing to Europe. Volunteers later accompanied refugees 
visiting government institutions, helped them learn German 
and gave valuable advice when searching for a flat in the normal 
housing market. 
More than 110 groups and institutions came together in the 
“Coalition of Refugee Aid Initiatives in Hamburg” (BHFI) to help 
refugees integrate society. Churches and mosques opened their 
doors and, at the peak of the crisis, even provided sleeping facilities 
for refugees for a few days until authorities could transfer them 
to professionally-operated sites. Foundations like the Lawaetz 
Stiftung, Körber Stiftung and Bürger Stiftung funded integration and 
support activities with refugees. Indeed, the response to the crisis 
was society-wide, and offi cials are grateful for the massive support 
that was “Willkommenskultur” at its best.
Authorities meet regularly with BHFI representatives to solve 
problems, sometimes even to find solutions for individuals. The 
BHFI argued for setting up the offi ce of an ombudsperson, where 
refugees and volunteers can voice their grievances. In July 2017, 
Mrs Annegrethe Stoltenberg took the position of an independent 
ombudswoman, supported by two staff. Her neutral institution is 
fully independent and treats complaints about the accommodation 
and integration of refugees with absolute discretion. 
There is a historic trauma behind the ongoing large-scale work of 
volunteers to support refugees: the state of Germany in May 1945 
after the defeat of the Nazi regime and the subsequent massive 
population shifts in post-World War II Europe. Some 10 million 
Germans alone fled to West Germany – from eastern German 
territories like Prussia that became Polish and Russian, and from 
countries where Germans were in a minority such as Czechoslovakia 
and Romania. 
For years, millions of Germans lived in dramatic conditions in farm 
barns, bombed-out houses, cellars and the infamous “Nissen 
barracks” that were designed by Canadian engineer Peter Nissen for 
the military during World War I. Almost every German family today 
can recount stories of grandparents who had to run for their lives 
in 1945.
“THE HAMBURG SENATE SET UP 
THE CENTRAL COORDINATION UNIT 
FOR REFUGEES (ZKF) TO REDUCE 




Challenges and risks 
specifi c to urban areas 
6. CITIZEN PARTICIPATION AND 
CONSENSUS-BUILDING
When many refugees were arriving in Hamburg every day at the 
end of 2015, authorities set up a number of huge facilities to house 
them. At one site, the Schnackenburgallee initial shelter, more than 
2,000 refugees were living there for a while. Dozens of other facilities 
harboured between 500 and 1,500 refugees. 
During the height of the crisis, citizen participation was minimal 
because there was simply no time to organise lengthy participation 
processes.  Authorit ies just  managed to invite cit izens in 
neighbourhoods to inform them that in a few days hundreds of 
refugees would be their neighbours. Most people were welcoming, 
but some voiced concerns related to security and to the ability of 
their community to absorb and integrate so many newcomers. 
Authorities during that period also started a programme of 
building high-quality public housing in different locations, one for 
up to 2,500 refugees. These plans and the lack of time for lengthy 
citizen participation processes led to the forming of a coalition of 
14 local neighbourhood initiatives under the umbrella of the newly-
formed “Hamburg für Gute Integration”, or “Hamburg for better 
Integration” (HGI).  
HGI mobilised tens of thousands of citizens, who signed petitions 
against large housing projects for refugees. They argued that this 
would lead to ghettos, preventing proper integration of refugees. 
Then they went a step further and launched a campaign to have a 
referendum on these housing projects. The Hamburg constitution 
allowed for such a democratic move. 
The Hamburg ruling coalition of Social Democrats and Greens 
immediately started negotiations with HGI and signed in July 2016 
a deal to prevent the planned referendum. Offi cials did not want an 
emotional campaign that could degenerate into an ugly debate for 
and against refugees. 
The main points of the deal with HGI, known as the Bürgerverträge 
(Citizen Agreements), are: 
•  In some of the high-quality public housing projects, the number of 
refugees will be reduced to a maximum of 300 refugees per project 
by the end of 2019.
•  Ever y new public housing site is bui lt  for a maximum of 
300 refugees.
•  A maximum of 300 housing sites for refugees are spread all over 
Hamburg. 
This deal would become obsolete if Hamburg was to face another 
massive infl ux of refugees. But this so called “3 times 300 formula” 
is being implemented. Authorities in Hamburg’s seven districts and 
state authorities like the Central Coordination Unit for Refugees 
(ZKF) regularly meet HGI representatives and monitor the 
implementation of the deal. 
In 2017, ZKF and HGI went a step further and agreed on a system 
to distribute refugees as fairly as possible among the city’s seven 
districts, known as the “orientation and distribution key for refugee 
accommodation”. Currently, refugee housing density is higher in 
medium and low income neighbourhoods, but authorities are now 
constructing more public housing in medium and high income areas.
Despite the deal with HGI, a number of neighbours 
adjacent to planned refugee housing sites fi led in 
2015-2016 lawsuits to prevent their construction. 
The city of Hamburg did not lose any lawsuit, but 
these legal battles delayed the construction of 
many housing projects for numerous months. 
7. PREPARING FOR THE NEXT WAVE 
The city of Hamburg expects that, in 2018, about 
3,600 additional refugees will need to be housed 
in publically funded sites in Hamburg. Refugees 
would be allowed to bring in about 1,500 close 
family members from abroad – in line with a 
government-sponsored family reunif ication 
programme. 
In addition, the ZKF will have, by the end of 2018, 
2,500 beds in reserve. The reason is that the 
refugee deal with Turkey is shaky, and the political 
situation in many countries in the Middle East 
and North Africa is tense. Add to it the migration 
pressure from sub-Saharan Africa northwards. 
Since mid-2018, the housing situation of refugees 
has started to ease as more and more were 
transferred from crowded initial shelters to 
public housing sites. The focus of authorities 
has shifted from providing quality housing to 
integration measures. 
8. THE CHALLENGE: INTEGRATING 
TENS OF THOUSANDS OF REFUGEES
Hamburg’s Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, 
Family and Integration in September 2017 
p u b l ish e d th e c i t y ’s  u p date d “ In te g r at io n 
Concept”. It is the product of a long process 
involving many official players like the ZKF and 
representatives of the seven districts as well as 
civil society groups and independent experts. 
The concept relies on the fact that successful 
i n te g r a t i o n  i s  o n l y  p o s s i b l e  w h e n  a l l  key 
actors interact in the field: refugees, migrant 
organisations, civil society groups and volunteers 
as well as public institutions on local, regional and 
national levels. Note that 33% of Hamburg citizens 
have a migration background. And about 50% of 
the under-18s have a migration background. 
The concept has two strategic lines:
1-  The intercultural  opening of  a l l  s tate 
institutions, meaning the reduction of structural 
discrimination in all walks of life. This would 
enable everyone to participate equally in central 
areas of society. Integration is therefore seen 
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9. CONCLUSION: RESILIENT HAMBURG 
The city has shown great resilience in coping with the massive 
infl ux of refugees since 2015. The main reasons are the following:
SOCIO-CULTURAL BACKGROUND IN GERMANY AND HAMBURG
•  Germany has become a multi-cultural, tolerant and open society.
•  The country learnt from the past migration waves. Germany from 
the mid-1950s till early 1970s attracted about 2.6 million migrants 
from Turkey, Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal. In the early 1990s, 
about a million people from war-torn Yugoslavia, from Romania 
and from Turkey applied for asylum. 
After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent collapse 
of all communist regimes in Eastern Europe, 600,000 East 
Germans moved to western Germany – together with hundreds 
of thousands of people with German roots from Eastern Europe. 
GOVERNANCE
•  Good governance is the rule in Hamburg. The city’s main 
administrative and political leaders meet twice a month and 
take consensual decisions. They ensure that important projects 
cannot be challenged by environmental protection, by not-in-
my-backyard attitudes or by local economic interests. Good 
governance also means transparency and public information, 
evaluation of our work and accountability. 
•  The Hamburg Senate set up the Central Coordination Unit for 
Refugees (ZKF) to reduce bureaucracy, and to enable quick 
decisions and implementation. Previously, competencies were 
split between the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of 
Labour, Social Aff airs, Family and Integration. 
T he unit focuses, among other things, on forecasting planning 
and city-wide coordination of refugee accommodation needs. 
It supports first integration measures such as childcare and 
kindergartens and helps guide refugees towards education, 
training and jobs. It is also involved in citizen participation 
processes and in mediation and confl ict resolution measures.
•  The economic boom: Hamburg has been funding the housing 
and integration of refugees from budget surplus – and not with 
loans or budget cuts impacting citizens negatively. 
CITIZEN PARTICIPATION
 •  As mentioned above, civil society groups and tens of thousands 
of volunteers helped authorities cope with the high number 
of refugees.
 •  Authorities started in 2015 with ad hoc events focusing on just 
informing neighbours about new refugee housing sites. In 2016, 
citizen participation became more refined, culminating in a 
lengthy process that involved seven workshops in Hamburg’s 
seven districts, where citizens commented on Hamburg’s 
integration policies. 
as an oppor tunity-oriented and measurable 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  o f  p e o p l e  w i t h  a  m i g r a t i o n 
background in central areas of social life. The 
intercultural opening of Hamburg’s public sector 
started in 2006 with a campaign called “We are 
Hamburg! Are you with us?” Staff since then have 
undergone intercultural training. 
The quota of trainees with migration backgrounds 
in the public sector went up from 5.2% in 2006 
to 18.1% in 2015. And the number of employees 
with migration backgrounds shot up from 8.9% 
in 2008 to 13% in 2016. The city is therefore 
moving steadily in the right direction to show that 
the public sector increasingly reflects society‘s 
cultural diversity.
2-  Refugees and migrant s have to show 
willingness to integrate. The highest priority is 
to learn German as fast as possible.  They need 
to accept Germany’s legal and social order, which 
is written in the constitution. Non-negotiable are 
key points like the rule of law, state neutrality in 
religious affairs, gender equality and child rights. 
In addition, refugees are expected to enter schools 
or training programmes so that, at some point, 
they can stand on their own two feet economically.
Hamburg’s integration concept not only lists 
all kinds of educational and training measures, 
it also includes target indicators. Here are three 
examples:
1- Language 2014 2015 2016
Goal 
2018
Percentage of people with 
migration background who 
pass the B1 language test
56.9% 60.5% 58.5% > 60%
2- High School 2014 2015 2016
Goal 
2018
Percentage of high school 
graduates with a migration 
background
39.7% 41.1% 45.8% 46%
Comparison: 59.5 % of German nationals with no migration 
background got a high school degree in 2016.
 3- Work 2014 2015 2016
Goal 
2018
Employment rate of people 
with a migrant background
64.7% 65.1% 63.0% > 65%
“IN 2015, ABOUT 890,000 REFUGEES 
CAME TO GERMANY; IN 2016 THE 
NUMBER DROPPED TO ABOUT 
280,000; IN 2017 IT WAS ABOUT 
187,000. THEREFORE, A TOTAL 




Challenges and risks 
specifi c to urban areas 
Members from civil society, migrant organisations, 
faith representatives and experts gave valuable 
input that found its way into the city’s updated 
integration concept, published by the Ministry of 
Labour, Social Affairs, Family and Integration in 
September 2017. 
In the meantime, almost every fourth refugee 
who has come to Germany since 2015 now has 
a job. If employment growth continues in this 
way, half of them will have a job after five years, 
according to a study by the Institute for Labour 
Market and Job Research (IAB). By the end of 
2018, between 8,500 and 10,000 more refugees 
in Germany would then find a job every month.
In 2015, about 890,000 refugees came to Germany; 
in 2016 the number dropped to about 280,000; 
in 2017 it was about 187,000. Therefore, a total of 
1.357 million refugees arrived in 2015-2017.
Integration measures are going ahead at full speed 
and bearing their first tangible results. But there 
are still important challenges ahead in integrating 
all newcomers in society and in daily life, and in 
enabling refugees to move as soon as possible 
from an initial shelter or public housing into normal, 
private dwellings. German authorities are aware 
that housing is a key part of the integration process 
because it provides stability in a private space.  
With the help of civil society and volunteers, the 
city of Hamburg is, in parallel, promoting daily 
interaction between refugees and residents. 
This helps to practice German language skills, 
to understand the values of a democratic and 
open society where the rule of law prevails, 
and it promotes sharing cultural experiences. 
Here again, volunteers play an invaluable role in 
making refugees feel that Germany is their new 
home, and where their loved ones have a safe and 
promising future.
Citizen participation on Hamburg’s integration concept, district of Nord, 
January 2017, ©ZKF
•  Central Coordination Unit for Refugees (Zentraler Koordinierungsstab Flüchtlinge, 
ZKF), Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg, http://www.hamburg.de/zkf-about-
us/; www.facebook.com/ZKF.Hamburg and www.twitter.com/ZKFHamburg 
•  Offi ce for Work and Integration (Amt Arbeit und Integration) at the Ministry of 
Labor, Social Affairs, Family and Integration, http://www.hamburg.de/basfi /
organisation/1593392/amt-ai/ 
•  Offi ce of the ombudsperson on refugee issues in Hamburg, http://www.hamburg.
de/ombudsstelle-fl uechtlinge  
•  Hamburg’s updated integration concept, published in September 2017, http://
www.hamburg.de/integration/service/115238/integrationskonzept/
•  The Federal Offi ce for Migration and Refugees, Berlin, http://www.bamf.de/EN/
Startseite/startseite-node.html 
•  Article 246, National Building Code (§ 246 Baugesetzbuch), https://www.gesetze-
im-internet.de/bbaug/__246.html 
•  Orientation and distribution key for refugee accommodation in Hamburg 
(Orientierungs- und Verteilungsschlüssel zur Flüchtlingsunterbringung), http://
www.hamburg.de/zkf-aktuelles/8492030/schluessel-fuer-gerechtere-verteilung-
von-fl uechtlingsunterkuenften-in-hamburg-vorgestellt and http://www.hamburg.
de/contentblob/8492096/732e3451ca489bce2e646197f13daa3d/data/170405-
neuer-verteilungsschluessel-fuer-fl uechtlinge-vorgestellt-dl.pdf 
•  Map, distribution of refugee housing sites in Hamburg, http://geoportal-hamburg.
de/fl uechtlingsunterkuenfte/?bezirk=0 
•  Sprinkenhof AG, https://www.sprinkenhof.de/ 
•  fördern & wohnen (f & w), https://www.foerdernundwohnen.de/ 
•  Project “Finding Places”, in cooperation with HafenCity University, https://www.
hcu-hamburg.de/index.php?id=9149&L=1 and http://edoc.sub.uni-hamburg.de/
hcu/volltexte/2018/429/pdf/FindingPlaces_Results_RZ_LowRes_170914_1.pdf
•  Coalition of Refugee Aid Initiatives in Hamburg (Bündnis Hamburger Flüchtlings-
Initiativen (BHFI), http://bhfi .de/ 
•  Initiatives for Better Integration (Initiativen für Gute Integration, IFI), https://www.
ifi -hamburg.de/ 
•  Institute for Labour Market and Job Research (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und 




Head of the Central Coordination Unit for Refugees
Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg, Germany
fl uechtlingskoordinator@zkf.hamburg.de
Press desk: +49 40 42839 3715
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